Chapter 75 – John

Charles Bean includes a detailed description of the events of the night of 6/7 August 1915 in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol II, chapter XX: The Night Advance on Sari Bair (pp. 567-596). Some referenced details include:

p. 567 – Description of the ridges and valleys leading up to the peak of Hill 971. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles moved out at 8:30pm, immediately after the fall of darkness, to begin sweeping the foothills north of Anzac.

p. 568 – The route of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles is described.

p. 570 – at 9:40pm the destroyer turned her light and guns onto Table Top, and delivered a bombardment until 10:00pm. The hill was seized by 11:00pm.

p. 575 – a loud cheer was raised at 12:45am, from the direction of Bauchop’s Hill or Chailak Dere, and was heard by all the columns.

p. 581 – plate opposite shows a three dimensional model illustrating the complex terrain, with the intended and actual routes of the left and right assault columns.

p. 582 –  Two battalions of the British 40th Brigade, being the 4th South Wales Borders and the 5th Wiltshire, marched ahead of the left assault column. During the advance, fire was coming from the hills to the right.

p. 583 – The advance force of the 40th Brigade marched north to the mouth of the valley Aghyl Dere, rushed Turkish positions that defended this area and cleared the way for the main left assault column as planned. This area was secured by 1:30am.

p. 584 – The coordinated assaults on the summit were due to occur “well before dawn.” Monash’s timetable and milestone distances are detailed. The covering force was expected to clear the way for the left assault column for all but the last mile to the summit. The 13th Battalion left Reserve Gully at precisely the time ordered, but the passing of the 40th Brigade delayed the other battalions.

p. 585 – The 40th Brigade was behind time and moved in parallel, over the tussocks and sand-hills a few yards nearer to the sea. The destroyer’s searchlight touched the column and some men were hit when “bullets fell somewhat thickly”. At about 11:00pm the column moved forward.

p. 586-7 – Shells lit up the hills. A white flare shot up occasionally from a Turkish post inland. At the head of the column, Major Overton, with his ten scouts, took the advice of a “native guide”, through an interpreter, to take a route different to that intended as it was shorter (map shown). The route taken passed between Walden Point and Bauchop’s Hill, rather than continue north to the mouth of Aghyl Dere before turning inland. The route taken was about half a mile shorter than the intended route, but was narrow and slow requiring movement in single file, and the men were fired upon from the right.

p. 589 – The pass taken between Walden Point and Bauchop’s Hill was later known as Taylor’s Gap. “Though it was only 600 yards in length, it’s passage by the two leading battalions had cost nearly three hours—roughly from 11 o’clock until 2.” Overton was not familiar with this route and found it difficult to judge what point in the dere (valley) had been reached. A crescent moon was rising at this time.

p. 590 – Monash reached the front of the column at 2:30am.

p. 593 – By the time the 4th Brigade had reached the Aghyl Dere, the covering force of the 40th Brigade was behind (to the west of) the main assault column (map shown).

John Monash’s letters to his wife Victoria are preserved in War Letters of General Monash . Some details include:

16 August – Monash describes events of the night of 6/7 August. On the march north “the hills came alive with the flashes of musketry and the bursting of shrapnel…It was a gloomy black night and one could not see ten yards ahead.” He had two Greek farmers who were supposed to know the country.

Roland Perry describes the August offensive in his biography Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War .  Some details referenced include:

210-11 – Monash had four doctors examine every man of the 4th Brigade during July 1915. Three stated that the men were not fit to shovel trenches or anything else. One doctor stated that the men could march for half a day if they were given adequate food, water and rest. The men were keen to move out of the crowded stinking conditions in Reserve Gully.

212 – Monash addressed the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the 4th Brigade on the morning of 6 August. The valley came under shrapnel fire during his speech, but he managed to keep his voice steady even though several men nearby were hit.

Peter Pederson, in Monash as a Military Commander , describes John Monash and the 4th Brigade’s involvement in the August offensive. Some referenced details include:

p. 98 – Details of Monash’s speech to his officers on the morning of 6 August, including a quote: “…A leader who is cool himself will inspire confidence and maintain throughout a grip of his men…”

p. 99 – Artillery fire wounded a man near him while he spoke. News of success at Line Pine came at 6:00pm. Monash jogged from Reserve Gully to No. 3 Outpost.

p. 100 – Men dived for cover, imitating those in front. The march slowed.

p. 101 – Monash was powerless in the centre of the column with Cox. Messengers to the front did not return, including McGlinn. John convinved Cox that he should be allowed to go forward himself. He found the column halted as two platoons of the 13th Battalion had been sent forward and not returned. Monash said “What damned nonsense! Get a move on quick.” The actual location was not known.

p. 102 – The New Zealand covering force had dislodged a Turkish force that was retreating across the path taken by the left assault column. This slowed the advance of the left column.